Compared to its southern neighbour, Canadian foreign policy often unfolds offstage. The country’s image as a moderate, rule-respecting “middle power” helps keep political controversy low and media attention scarce. However, when we pull Canada’s foreign policy record into view, especially its affairs in the Middle East, the “lesser evil” narrative looks less like virtue and more like a cushion against scrutiny.
One reason for the attention gap is systemic. Canadians consume a significant volume of news from the United States, and recent constraints on Canadian news distribution, such as the 2023 Meta news ban, have reduced the visibility of Canadian journalism in global platform flows. Industry analyses note that Canada’s high consumption of news from foreign sources, especially the US’ highly polarized political and cultural debates, pushes attention away from Canada’s own foreign policy. As a result, domestic coverage of Canadian foreign policy receives fewer cycles of sustained interest, with housing affordability, inflation, and health care backlogs dominating domestic headlines, leaving foreign policy with fewer cycles of sustained interest.
At the same time, Canada’s enduring peacekeeping myth contributes to public disengagement from foreign policy. While many Canadians still characterize the country’s foreign security by their blue helmets and international mediation, the reality is quite different. Direct United Nations peacekeeping deployments are at historic lows: as of 2023-2024, Canada has just 47 military and police personnel deployed throughout the UN system. This sharp drop contrasts with past decades of significant participation and suggests that the brand of “peacekeeper Canada” no longer matches practice. To understand how this image took hold, it’s worth recalling that Canada’s peacekeeping record itself has long been uneven. Some missions enhanced stability, while others, such as Somalia and Rwanda, revealed deep flaws in both strategy and accountability. If Canadians believe their country is already a “good player,” in world affairs, the incentive to question its foreign policy becomes much weaker.
Nowhere is the gap between image and practice more evident than in the Middle East, particularly in Canada’s response to the Gaza war and its broader relationship with Israel. On October 27, 2023, Canada sponsored a UN General Assembly amendment that would have condemned Hamas for the October 7 attack on Israel, as well demanded the immediate release of hostages. That amendment, however, failed to secure the two-thirds majority required. In the full resolution that followed, Canada abstained rather than voting in favour or against. The resolution called for an “immediate and sustained humanitarian truce,” but omitted any direct condemnation of Hamas or explicit recognition of hostages. Canada’s official explanation emphasized Israel’s right to self-defence and indicated concern that the draft resolution failed to address issues such as the condemnation of Hamas and the hostages’ release.
December 12, 2023, Canada shifted course and voted in favour of a UN resolution demanding an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza and for Hamas’ release of hostages, which passed 153 to 10 with 23 abstentions. Ottawa’s statement referenced “the urgent need to protect civilians” while reaffirming its support for Israel’s security. By June 12, 2025, Canada voted yes on another UN resolution centredaround the protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law, showing that Ottawa’s posture was evolving not toward moral leadership, but toward cautious responsiveness under mounting global and domestic scrutiny as the conflict continued.
Meanwhile, arms and export permit policy moved together in tandem. On January 8, 2024, the Canadian government announced it would stop approving new export permits to Israel amid human rights concerns. In March, Parliament passed a non-binding motion, 204 to 117, calling to halt arms exports to Israel and to work toward the establishment of a Palestinian state within a two-state solution. Rights advocates such as Project Ploughshares and the Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights noted, however, that existing arms permits issued before January remained valid, and that the indirect shipment of arms through the United States raised doubts about Canada’s ability to control the downstream use of its exports. These inconsistencies suggest that Ottawa’s restraint was more performative than principled — a move that projected moral awareness while sidestepping the deeper contradictions within its own export system.
Canadian civil society groups and a UN rights committee also raised concerns that Canadian-made arms or components could reach Israel or Gaza through third-party routes, exposing Canada to potential complicity in violations of international humanitarian law. Analysts have pointed out that Ottawa’s export controls tend to be reactive rather than preventive, as the federal government focuses on evidence of prior misuse instead of assessing substantial risks ahead of arms transfers. This differs from the traditional image of Canada as merely passive in world affairs. Passivity, in this case, implies inaction or withdrawal, but reactivity reflects something more strategic: an effort to preserve Canada’s reputation by acting only once public or diplomatic pressure demands it.
Canada’s foreign policy in the Middle East is problematic not because of our government’s overt malice but because of its complacency. Canada has managed to navigate the Gaza conflict deftly enough: shifting votes, freezing new permits, and maintaining humanitarian rhetoric without provoking major backlash. However, this apparent skill in avoiding public backlash and sustaining Canada’s reputation as a balanced actor owes more to low media visibility and selective framing than to Parliament’s coherence or conviction.
While Canada paused new export permits to Israel, investigative reports indicate that Canadian-made munitions have still entered the region via U.S. routes as the country remains among the top non-U.S. arms exporters. In 2023, Canada exported $904.6 million (CAD) worth of military goods to Saudi Arabia, despite the kingdom’s documented human rights abuses. The “lesser evil” label endures because Canada’s action seems modest beside those of larger Western powers, yet limited news coverage and minimal public backlash reveal how invisibility, not accountability, sustains this image.
Canada’s policy in the Middle East remains largely obscured by its reputation for moderation and
a lack of public scrutiny. The lack of direct confrontation with allies or regimes accused of human- rights abuses may look like pragmatism, but it risks eroding the moral foundation of Canadian diplomacy, which is built on the country’s long- standing claim to uphold human rights, multilateralism, and international law. When values that define national identity are not matched by consistent action displaying these ideals, a cautious, low-profile foreign policy becomes a liability.
Though it rarely makes front-page news, Canada’s role in global affairs is far from benign. By characterizing its stance in the Middle East as mild, Canada benefits from its reputation as the “lesser evil” among Western powers. But that image holds up only because its actions often trail behind its values. For Canadians to live up to their self-image, they need to push for change through greater transparency and consistency between values and action, and stronger civic engagement.